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This is a temporary solution to the issue of 
our residency ... the area might become West 
Bank any moment, and we don’t know what 
do if that happens. The fact that it’s excluded 
from Jerusalem by the wall, and that Israel 
allows for such ‘ashwa’iyat1 means that it 
will be excluded one day. I won’t be able to 
live with my family in that case.
—Kareem, 33
We are like sheep, through their policies and 
laws they push us here and lead us to the 
destination they want. We have no control 
over where our lives are headed. Kufr ‘Aqab 
will remain as it is because they don’t want 
all these Palestinians migrating back to 
Jerusalem. The investigator told me that Kufr 
‘Aqab is the storage space for Israel, like the 
storage you keep in your home for junk you 
don’t want.
—Ismail, 38
In late October 2015, at the time of writing this 
article, Israeli media reported on Benjamin 
Netanyahu’s recent remarks calling for the 
consideration of revocation of residency 
status of East Jerusalem Palestinians living 
on the eastern side of the separation wall.2 
Netanyahu claimed that residents of these 
QHLJKERUKRRGV³GRQRW IXO¿OO WKHLUGXWLHVDV
residents, while enjoying the rights that the 
State of Israel gives them.”3 Israel’s strategy 
of minimizing the number of Palestinians 
in Jerusalem goes beyond the physicality 
of the separation wall and into the intimate 
control of Palestinian life at the capillary 
level, through the strict enforcement of the 
Jerusalem permit regime. The combination 
of the “center of life” policy, which requires 
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem to 
constantly prove that they are living within 
Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries, and 
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SURKLELWLRQ RI IDPLO\ UHXQL¿FDWLRQ RI 3DOHVWLQLDQ VSRXVHVZLWK GLIIHUHQW OHJDO VWDWXV
have complicated family life, mobility, and residency decisions. Through interviews 
with residents of Kufr ‘Aqab, one of the northernmost neighborhoods on the east of 
the separation wall to which Netanyahu refered, this study sheds light on how such 
mechanisms impact everyday life. It highlights how such mechanisms have become 
deeply entrenched in individual, family and community structure, impacting individual 
partner choice and family formation; birthing and child registration; and manifested in 
the omnipresent system of surveillance in the form of investigators. 
Background and Context
Following Israel’s illegal and unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the 
boundaries of the city expanded threefold to include newly captured lands of 28 
surrounding villages.4 The extension of municipal and administrative control over the 
ZKROHRIQHZO\DQQH[HG-HUXVDOHPZKLFKZDVFRGL¿HG in the form of Israel’s amendment 
to the “Laws of the State” and the “Basic Law” on Jerusalem, would later result in 
Israel’s imposition of the “permanent residency” regime.5 At the time, Israeli authorities 
conducted a census whereby Israeli “permanent residency”6 status was granted to about 
66,000 Jerusalemites who were physically present in Jerusalem; residents who were not 
present at the time lost their right to reside in Jerusalem.7 
Compared to Palestinians residing in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,8 permanent 
residency status offers a relative degree of freedom of movement, the right to live and work 
in Israel, as well as entitlements to social and health care provided by the Israeli National 
Insurance Institute.9 However, despite their longstanding connection to Jerusalem,10 
permanent residents do not have citizenship rights and their only legal bond to the state is 
their permanent residency. That is, unlike Israeli citizens, they are unable to travel freely 
across Israeli borders (except with permission from the minister of interior) and unable to 
automatically pass their legal status to their children (except under limited circumstances 
at the discretion of the minister of interior). Moreover, while the revocation of Israeli 
citizenship is virtually impossible, the risk of revocation of permanent residency status 
is ever-present and left to the absolute discretion of the minister of interior.11 Hence the 
weight of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu’s reported cogitation on mass revocation of 
residency for Palestinian Jerusalemites “outside” the wall. 
Since 1967, it is estimated that about 14,200 East Jerusalem permanent residency 
holders have had their rights revoked.12 Most of these residents are alleged to no longer 
meet requirements of the “center of life” policy, which was introduced in 1995 and 
requires that permanent residents consistently prove that they reside within Jerusalem 
municipal boundaries and submit regular documentation substantiating this claim.
With the construction of the separation wall in,VUDHOSK\VLFDOO\VROLGL¿HGLWV
control of the illegally annexed territories. Jerusalem city, included inside the wall, is 
now cut off from the remainder of the West Bank and is only accessible through a series 
of checkpoint gates that require Israeli approval for entrance. Palestinians cross the 
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military checkpoints in a pathway barricaded by metal bars, through revolving gates 
that OHDG LQWR LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ DQG VHFXULW\ FKHFNV 2QFH WKURXJK WKH JDWHV, Jerusalem 
permanent residents may pass to the other side by virtue of their legal documentation; 
residents of the West Bank are denied entry, unless they acquire an Israeli-issued permit 
beforehand. These are given only under special circumstances, and are extremely 
GLI¿FXOWWRREWDLQ13 Such physical barriers have effectively moved East Jerusalem, once 
the center of Palestinian political, economic, religious, and cultural life, to the margins 
of Palestinian society, exacerbating a process that began earlier.14
In further constricting the freedom of permanent residents, a 2003 amendment to the 
Nationality Law prohibited Palestinians with permanent residency who are married to 
Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza from applying IRUIDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQVRWKDW
their spouse can obtain Jerusalem residency.15 Thus, many permanent residents who 
have been denied IDPLO\UHXQL¿FDWLRQDQGFDQQRWOLYH³OHJDOO\´LQ-HUXVDOHPFLW\ZLWK
their families, have been forced into areas where they would maintain their residency 
ULJKWVE\IXO¿OOLQJWKH³FHQWHURIOLIH´requirement, while living with West Bank ID–
carrying spouses, children and other family members who cannot access or reside in 
Jerusalem without a permit from Israel. 
Kufr ‘Aqab is one such area. Since it is (dis)located outside the wall and the 
Qalandiya checkpoint, and yet is within the Israeli-GH¿QHG -HUXVDOHP PXQLFLSDO
boundaries, it provides a legal basis for families of different legal status to live 
together. As Noura Alkhalili, Muna Dajani, and Daniela De Leo have argued, such 
residual spaces on the peripheries of Jerusalem are manifestations of discriminatory 
planning strategies that seek to displace Palestinian Jerusalemites.16 These areas have 
been produced to host displaced Palestinian Jerusalemites, harnessing the illusion of 
inhabiting Jerusalem. Some estimates suggest that over 100,000 Palestinians live in 
East Jerusalem neighborhoods beyond the separation wall, with the population of Kufr 
‘Aqab and Semiramis (another such Jerusalem neighborhood located beyond the wall) 
somewhere between 60,000 and 80,000.17*LYHQ WKH SROLWLFDOO\ GLFWDWHGPDVV LQÀX[
of people to Kufr ‘Aqab, this onetime sleepy village has been transformed into an 
area characterized by overcrowding, unregulated construction, and urban sprawl with 
detrimental environmental living conditions. Although residents are required to pay 
municipal taxes, municipal services are virtually absent in these areas and therefore 
a paradoxical state void, characterized by a physical retreat from the area, is marked. 
Moreover, the physical exclusion of Kufr ‘Aqab by the wall – and the precarious nature 
of its current Jerusalem status that this seems to imply – signals the possibility of a 
future re-demarcation of Jerusalem municipal boundaries in which it is not included, 
leaving many residents uneasy about the future of their families’ legal status.
While an exploration of the physical manifestations of the space as a result of 
discriminatory policies and mechanisms of control is important, the focus of this 
research seeks to look beyond the physicality of space in understanding the impact 
of these measures on intimate everyday life. Indeed, this research clearly illustrates 
that Kufr ‘Aqab residents are exposed to various life-stressors, including anxiety 
resulting from legal and administrative battles to maintain residency; the distress of 
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having to relocate to areas with poorer living conditions in order to maintain Jerusalem 
residency; and feelings of mistrust and community disintegration. Elia Zureik and 
Nigel Parsons and Mark B. Salter have emphasized the need to incorporate an analysis 
of biopolitical practices of mobility regulation to explain the context of the occupied 
Palestinian territories.18 Biopolitical practices, which include physical manifestations 
of control like the separation wall, Israeli army checkpoints which dot the landscape, 
and other physical obstructions to movement, as well as identity documentation and an 
overarching permit regime, all of which sever families from each other, are all central 
to this discussion. Moreover, given the diffused nature of Israeli power throughout the 
whole of the territory, the biopolitical lens is useful insofar as policing essentially takes 
place everywhere.19
We expand on this notion of biopolitics in illustrating the profound control of 
intimate family life and its contribution to the disintegration of community through the 
Kufr ‘Aqab case study. Drawing on the Israeli-imposed policies and restrictions which 
permeate Palestinian family life, we recognize a peculiar type of “displacement” in Kufr 
‘Aqab, where the type of immobility imposed is not only physical and bureaucratic, 
but also includes a paradoxical mobility forced on families to move to areas like 
Kufr ‘Aqab because of the overriding circumstances (including discriminatory land 
and housing policies in areas to the west of the wall), but ironically implemented by 
families themselves for the sake of family survival and viability. In addition, given 
the restrictions in movement managed and controlled by Israel by virtue of Israeli-
GH¿QHG legal status and the permit regime, families formed of members with different 
legal statuses compromise any sense of “mobility” to maintain the family, even if an 
individual within the family is relatively more “mobile.” This paradoxical “immobile 
mobility,” then, where the family must relocate to an area with a politically ambiguous 
future in order to maintain residency status temporarily for some of its members, is 
UHL¿HGE\WKHUHSHUFXVVLRQVRI bureaucratic and indirect, through arguably acute, forms 
of violence. The study highlights the severe uncertainty and insecurity that characterizes 
the lives of many of Kufr ‘Aqab’s inhabitants. 
Methodology
7KH¿QGLQJVVHWIRUWKLQWKLVVWXG\DUHEDVHGRQ an analysis of 63 in-depth qualitative 
interviews, conducted with 27 women, 20 men, and 16 young people (aged between 
18–25) residing in Kufr ‘Aqab. Interviews with women and men were conducted by 
the lead author and interviews with young people were conducted by the second author. 
Fieldwork was conducted in the period between October 2013 and August 2015, in 
places where participants felt comfortable speaking.
The semi-structured interview schedule explored questions related to reasons for 
relocating to Kufr ‘Aqab, living conditions, and the quality of individual and family life. 
Participants were selected through purposeful-convenience sampling methods to include 
Palestinians with Jerusalem residency married to residents of the West Bank and vice 
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versa, and were solicited through snowballing. The Institute of Community and Public 
Health (ICPH) Research Ethics Committee granted ethical approval. Participants were 
presented with an oral LQIRUPHGFRQVHQWDQGFRQ¿GHQWLDOLW\VWDWHPHQWDQG LQGLFDWHG
whether or not they agreed to participate in the study. Care has been taken to maintain 
participant’s anonymity in writing their narratives and concealing their identities when 
publishing research. The names used throughout this paper are pseudonyms. Narratives 
were analyzed thematically through repeated reading and re-reading, where patterns, 
themes, and sub-themes gradually appeared. In this paper, we attempt to address a select 
range of issues extrapolated from the data. These are highlighted through the narratives 
of participants presented below. 
Partner Choice and Family Formation in Political Limbo
From 1967 until 2000,20 it was possible for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and 
Palestinian citizens of Israel married to Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza 
to obtain legal statusIRUWKHLUVSRXVHVE\DSSO\LQJIRUIDPLO\XQL¿FDWLRQ21 Essentially, 
non-Jewish foreigners married to an Israeli citizen or resident might (background 
“security” checks permitting) acquire the same status as their sponsor. He or she would 
go through what is known as a “gradual process,” whereby they would initially acquire 
a “temporary permit” to live in Israel, followed by “temporary resident status,” and 
then “residency.” And, if the sponsor were an Israeli citizen, he or she would acquire 
citizenship.22 In 2003, the Knesset enacted the Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law 
7HPSRUDU\ 2UGHU SURKLELWLQJ IDPLO\ XQL¿FDWLRQ EHWZHHQ ,VUDHOL FLWL]HQV (mostly 
Palestinian citizens of Israel) and residents, and their spouses from the West Bank and 
Gaza.23
The promulgation of WKLV RUGHU GHQ\LQJ IDPLO\ XQL¿FDWLRQ RI 3DOHVWLQLDQV ZLWK
different legal status has had serious consequences on family formation, and the narratives 
obtained highlight how politically induced stressors become intimately intertwined in 
everyday family life. While the order impacts both residents of Jerusalem as well as 
Palestinian citizens of Israel who are married to residents of the West Bank and Gaza 
(excluding occupied East Jerusalem), the study focuses on Palestinian Jerusalem ID 
holders (Israeli residents) married to residents with West Bank IDs.
In light of an already uncertain future, participants expressed worries about how 
issues related to their legal status strain their relationships and create marital tension. 
Spousal reactions to unions of different legal status seem to oscillate between feelings 
of renewed perseverance and regret in hindsight. Some participants pride themselves 
for their ability to maintain their relationship against all odds. They feel they have 
challenged a state determined to controlWKHLUIUHHGRPWROLYHDQGORYHDVWKH\VHH¿W. 
For them, this obstacle becomes a site of resistance. Others regret subjecting themselves 
and their children to this type of VXIIHULQJ ,Q UHÀHFWLRQ6DZVDQ VWDWHG ³+DG ,
known itZRXOGEHWKLVGLI¿FXOW,ZRXOGQ¶WKDYHHYHQORRNHG in his direction.”
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In other narratives, regret was expressed in the form of advising against unions of 
mixed legal statuses, urging their friends and families to learn from their experiences. 
:KLOHVRPHZHUHEODWDQWO\GLVFRXUDJLQJRWKHUVZDUQHGRIVHYHUHGLI¿FXOW\ that could 
EHRYHUFRPHLI\RXDUHZLOOLQJWR¿JKW for it and make major compromises. Based on 
the narratives, there is some indication that unmarried young people are becoming more 
DZDUHRIWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVDKHDGDQGDUHPDNLQJFRQVFLRXV decisions to avoid this type of 
suffering. Sara, 30, stated:
I only started to think of how tragic the Jerusalem ID is when I was getting 
married. After they saw what we went through, my sisters decided that a 
Jerusalem ID is a priority for them when they get married. It’s the first filter, 
everything else comes after.
One participant (Ahmad, 50) noted his attempt to introduce his colleague at the university 
to a potential partner.
At the beginning, it seemed like a good match. They really liked each other, 
but when he realized she had a West Bank ID, he opted out. He said that he 
doesn’t have the power it takes to deal with the hardships and he doesn’t 
want to spend his life at the [Israeli] ministry of interior. It’s a shame it 
ended, but that’s just the way it is.
Another participant (Dina, 28) whose mother married a resident of the West Bank did 
not want her children to do the same, likening the prospect to marrying a foreigner: 
My mother says jokingly “we have enough family unification cases in 
our family.” But really, she worries about this. She even used the word 
yatagharribu24 when she talks about this . . . People say such things from 
the tragedies they have lived. Maybe at the end of the day, people decide 
not to marry someone with a different ID because of the circumstances, 
but deep inside, they feel they are not different, they are both Palestinians. 
Although members of the family with Jerusalem residency can theoretically maintain 
their own legal status and their choice of partner by living in Kufr ‘Aqab, the couple 
compromises family cohesion and quality of life. Interactions with the state system, 
in the form of legal bureaucracy and physical checkpoints restricting movement make 
apparent the invisible biopolitical clutch of the state into seemingly mundane family 
affairs and obligations. These have disastrous effects on the family, often culminating in 
tensions and prolonged anxiety.
Physical barriers make their way into the practicalities of everyday family life, 
restricting mobility for family with different legal status. Points of direct interaction 
with soldiers at checkpoints are not merely physical boundaries restricting movement. 
For couples carrying different residency status, they serve as markers to your position 
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vis-à-vis the occupation. As Mohammad, 33, recounted:
My brother-in-law was getting married; the wedding procession began 
outside the wall where the families met. I was able to attend that, but I faced 
problems when the wedding ceremony moved inside the wall, near my in-
laws’ house. Imagine my situation. Everyone was well dressed, they were 
just at a wedding. We got stopped at the checkpoint, and everyone with a 
Jerusalem ID was allowed to pass except for me. I have a West Bank ID. 
They had to wait while I was interrogated by the soldier and managed to 
convince him to let me through. I felt so embarrassed that they had to wait 
for me ... I felt like a stranger, I felt like I am less than all of them because 
they can come and go ... I mean, I know I’m not inferior to them, but I can’t 
help feeling that way ... I was in shock.
Although we cannot extrapolate or conclude that changes in marriage patterns are 
occurring based on legal status, these narratives raise concerns that Israeli policies 
GHQ\LQJ IDPLO\ XQL¿FDWLRQ are in some ways succeeding in further fragmenting 
Palestinian communities. Some participants noted that such policies have been 
internalized and manifested in self-policing their own love. Indeed, the lived experiences 
of couples juggling choice of partner and family sustainability in the corridors of an 
overly regulated political legal system attest to this phenomenon. 
Life in the Margins: Birthing, Boundaries, and Wellbeing
Although under Israeli law a child born to an Israeli citizen is entitled to citizenship 
by virtue of his or her parents, the same does not hold true for a Jerusalem permanent 
resident. Jerusalem residents cannot automatically pass on their residency status to 
their children, and need to ensure that their children are born in an Israeli recognized 
Jerusalem hospital so they may begin the process of registration.25 For residents of Kufr 
‘Aqab, giving birth in a hospital inside Jerusalem is especially challenging because of 
the physical barriers, especially when the female spouse is a resident of the West Bank, 
since she has very limited access to Jerusalem. Birthing in this context presents a special 
conundrum for couples living in Kufr ‘Aqab, especially for those with different legal 
status.
7KH¿QGLQJVRIWKLVVWXG\FRUURERUDWHPDQ\RI1DGHUD6KDOKRXE.HYRUNLDQ¶V¿QGLQJV
in her research focusing on the politics of birthing in occupied East Jerusalem. Shalhoub-
Kevorkian provides narratives from women taking considerable risks to ensure that their 
children are born in Jerusalem, and argues that gendered violence against Palestinian 
women’s bodies is part of a larger system of structural dispossession.26 In a similar 
vein in Kufr ‘Aqab, women interviewed described heightened anxiety and stress during 
times of pregnancy and childbirth for issues related to unplanned birthing outside the 
,VUDHOLGH¿QHGPXQLFLSDOERXQGDULHVRIJerusalem. And given Kufr ‘Aqab’s dislocation 
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outside the separation wall and the physical obstacles couples may face in reaching 
Jerusalem inside the wall, these fears were internalized and negatively embodied in 
their pregnancy and birthing experiences.
Women often articulated fears of giving birth at a checkpoint, fearing the denial of 
WKHLUFKLOG¶VELUWKFHUWL¿FDWH ,QGHHGLQ WKHFRQWH[WRI3DOHVWLQH IROORZLQJLQWHQVL¿HG
closure and restrictions on movement, birthing at checkpoints has become an increasingly 
pressing issue, changing birthing location patterns in the occupied Palestinian 
territories.27 Between 2000 and 2007, for example, 10 percent of pregnant Palestinian 
women heading to hospitals to give birth were delayed at checkpoints, resulting in 69 
births and 35 infant and 5 maternal deaths.28 
One woman living in Kufr ‘Aqab who had previously witnessed another woman 
having to give birth at the checkpoint expressed her obsessive thinking about the 
possibility of this happening to her on her way from Kufr ‘Aqab to a Jerusalem hospital 
inside the wall. Much of her psychologically distressed state during her pregnancy was 
attributed to this memory, furthering an already anxious experience in her own life. 
Another participant mentioned that she had a miscarriage at the checkpoint, indicating 
the perceived link between physical political barriers and induced anxiety and distress 
leading to negative health outcomes.
The place of birth was so crucial in one woman’s birthing experience that she put 
herself at risk in order to ensure the documentation of the newborn child. Indeed many 
women discussed feelings of familial separation, despite little geographic distance. 
Natasha, 38, is one example:
We were newlywed, it was my first pregnancy and I was in my eight month. 
I sneaked into Jerusalem to my in-laws house. I was “illegal” for a whole 
month, but worse than that is that I felt like a stranger. I mean, we just got 
married and my husband was working in the north and would come only 
once a week. And of course, my mother couldn’t reach me. All of this for the 
sake of ensuring birth in the right hospital. I really felt like I was in prison. 
These feelings of lessened social and familial support are arguably “false” states induced 
by the biopolitical power of bureaucracies and physical barriers imposed by the Israeli 
occupation, which lead to the potential breakdown of traditional support networks. For 
Jerusalemite women, the support network is compromised at its core, with the common 
exclusion of the father of the child if he is a resident of the West Bank and does not have 
a military permit to access Jerusalem. Mariam, 35, described the feelings produced by 
such a situation:
 
When I’m at the hospital alone I feel my soul is reaching out of my body; 
I want my husband there by my side to help me. When I remember how 
difficult that was, I tell my family and friends to only consider marrying 
someone with the same ID so they’ll never have to experience it. 
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While some women suffer from the breakdown of traditional support networks, 
men unable to access Jerusalem during childbirth are robbed of their initiation into 
fatherhood and witnessing the ¿UVWSUHFLRXVKRXUVRIWKHLUQHZERUQ¶VOLIH.DUHHP
was one of the male participants that described agonizing experiences: 
My wife went for a check-up in Jerusalem; she was 7 months pregnant 
at the time. She had complications and needed to deliver right away. She 
called frantically and said she needed to go into an operation. It was 10:00 
pm, and my permit had expired at 7:00 pm. I couldn’t get in ... the most I 
could do was pick up her sister and drop her off at the checkpoint ... I sat in 
the car and began to cry. It was one of the very few times I’ve cried in my 
life. It was the worst moment. I kept saying: Why me? Why now? It was a 
horrible feeling. My sister-in-law’s husband was able to be there and I, her 
husband, could not be there. 
Another man, who was also unable to access Jerusalem while his wife was in labor, 
narrated a sober account of this experience. As his voice receded, he was unable to 
articulate his feelings and merely ridiculed the fact that he had to send his well-wishes 
(hamdillah ‘al-salama) over the phone, despite the fact that husband and wife were, 
physically, just a few miles apart. 
To avoid this experience, one woman asked her doctor to induce her birth in line with 
the duration of a permit allowance given to her husband so she could ensure he would 
be able to witness the birth of their child. Having understood WKHGLI¿FXOW\LQREWDLQLQJD
permit for her husband in time for childbirth, the doctor empathized with the couple and 
agreed to an induced labor. This particular story illustrates the imposition of the state on 
the natural rhythms of childbearing, thereby trespassing on women’s bodies throughout 
the birthing process. 
Indeed, the fears of giving birth at the “wrong” place and time is a politically dictated 
emotion resulting from the prospect of missing the crucial opportunity for documentation 
vital for the future and does not fall within the “normal” realm of birthing experiences of 
most couples. These fears push women to take potential health risks and illustrate how 
their political reality interacts with traditional support networks and stress. 
Recognizing the Family:  
(Il)legality and Surveillance in an Uncertain Future 
Beyond the politics of birthing at the “right” place and time, many participants in the 
VWXG\ DOVR GLVFXVVHG WKH GLI¿FXOWLHV RI proceeding with registration long after birth. 
“Proving” the child’s existence requires years of consolidating proper documentation 
and various investigations carried out by the Israeli National Insurance Institute. 
In order to register a child, families must again prove that their “center of life” is in 
Jerusalem. This process requires the collection of documents that link a family’s various 
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living domains to the municipality borders. And while their meticulous collection is 
time-consuming and demoralizing, these rather mundane documents became markers of 
their identity and, as expressed, “proof of existence.” As Dina, 28, explained:
We can’t throw away anything. We keep tax payments, rental agreements, 
water and electricity bills, medical receipts and school certificates. Because 
each one of us has a different ID, my mother keeps a folder for each, marked 
by a different color. My brother is 16 and still has no ID. His file is the 
thickest. The second file is for those who have an ID number, my mother and 
other brother. The smallest is me and my sisters’ – we have West Bank IDs.
Participants narrated years of unsettling experiences related to their unpleasant, but 
necessary, trips to the ministry of interior, battling back and forth between having no 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ QXPEHU KDYLQJ D ³WHPSRUDU\´ QXPEHU and obtaining a “permanent” 
residency number. In some cases, the registration of children born to the same parents 
was characterized by different patterns of experiences with each child, depending on 
new policies being implemented at a given time. Mariam, 40, described her struggle to 
register her children:
I registered my kids after a lot of perseverance and lawyer fees. It was an 
accomplishment. But it’s humiliation at the same time. For three years 
[before she was approved, my daughter] Sara had no ID; she got one in 
2006. [My son] Yusuf got a temporary ID for two years and then a permanent 
number in 2009. So from 2006 till 2009, I barely had a birth certificate even 
though I gave birth to them in Jerusalem. Those years were very stressful. I 
wouldn’t be able to sleep thinking that my children have no proof of existence 
in the world. Thoughts like these set my heart on fire.
In addition to the documentation required, proving that Jerusalem is the “center of 
life” for applicants requires passing an investigation carried out by the Israeli National 
Insurance Institute. The family must “pass” the investigation in order to process the 
children’s registration and obtain permanent residency. The investigation process has 
been described as extremely intrusive, creating a source of extreme anxiety for many. 
Asma, 36, told of one incident:
My husband was out of town, I was home alone. The investigator came 
unexpected and asked to see the house. He looked inside the fridge, inside 
the toilet bin; he checked if the toothbrushes are wet and opened my closet. 
He went through my clothes. Apparently such invasion of privacy is normal. 
He kept interrogating me and accusing me of lying about living here. I 
know this is expected, but was shocked for three days afterwards. I kept 
shaking. I felt extremely unsafe in my own house. He is Palestinian, but I 
felt he was Israeli. 
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Participants expressed different views on the investigation process. Whereas some 
delegitimized the investigators, who are Palestinians, implying that their work is a form 
of collaboration with Israel, others saw them in a less negative light. In fact, some 
saw the investigation as a necessary disturbance, indicating there was progress in the 
processing of their application in the Israeli bureaucracy, however intrusive. As Laila, 
43, said:
It is normal that it’s intrusive, it’s an investigation. In fact, once they 
come, you feel that you have achieved something at least; it’s a positive 
development, signaling your application is being processed. I try to make 
the best of it, to use the opportunity to show that I do really live there, that 
I can for example easily navigate the space and make coffee.
In all cases, the investigators are seen as holding power over the family’s future. The 
SHUVRQDO LPSUHVVLRQ WKH\ UHÀHFW WR WKH LQYHVWLJDWRUPDNHV LWVZD\ LQWR RI¿FLDO OHJDO
documentation that ultimately determines whether or not the state is convinced of their 
residency. The SRZHURIRI¿FLDOMXGJPHQWUHLQIRUFHVWKHSRZHUG\QDPLFLQKHUHQWLQthe 
relation of state bureaucrats to its subjects. Whereas some residents attempt to impress 
the investigator by organizing the myriad of documents required or by being warm 
and hospitable to WKHLU ³JXHVW´RWKHUV UHDFWZLWKGH¿DQFH DWWHPSWLQJ WR UHFODLP WKH
domestic space that has been intruded upon. In this sense, they renegotiate the power 
dynamic inherent within the system and create sites of resistance. Dalia, 28, described 
her mother’s response:
When the investigator comes, my mother does not allow him to question each 
one of us separately. She insists that we’re all in the same room. She also 
refused to begin answering questions until the investigator gives his complete 
name and family name, and then she draws on her local Jerusalemite lineage 
and history about the families there to say “ah, you are the son of so-and-so” 
... this makes them clearly uncomfortable.
Fear, Mistrust, and Communal Fragmentation
Participants described how the investigator’s work often went beyond their nuclear 
family to the extended one. Moreover, the narratives indicate that this type of surveillance 
is lived and experienced in public spaces, where participants feel vulnerable and subject 
to covert investigation. Samah, 35, recalled an investigator who “presented to me 
pictures of myself outside my old house in Ramallah; he accused me of living there . . . 
I explained I was only picking up some stuff.”
Participants discussed the LQYHVWLJDWRUV¶LQ¿OWUDWLRQRIWKH-HUXVDOHPFRPPXQLW\WR
gather information that may be used to revoke permanent residency status in Jerusalem 
or obstruct a process of registration. As Ayman, 40, noted: 
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They come dressed casually as any other men from the community, or come 
disguised as phone company employees and ask the shops and neighbors 
about so-and-so. They speak as if they are from the area, asking about Abu 
or Umm Ahmad,29 for example, to check if people have seen them around. 
They are sneaky. Whenever we see someone looking in our direction we 
immediately think, “he’s an investigator.”
Consequently, many residents described community unease and fear in building social 
relations. These feelings generated an unwillingness to form neighborly bonds, with 
mistrust permeating communities. Dia, 37, related that the investigation regime
is affecting us; it is causing a lot of fear. I, for example, don’t want to meet 
the neighbors so that we don’t exchange stories and I won’t have to lie one 
day if I am asked about them, and so they don’t have to do the same for 
me. Even though my building has 36 families, I only know three of my 
neighbors, and even with them we just say “hello.” This would not be the 
case anywhere else.
An elderly Palestinian woman takes a break as she walks up Kufr ‘Aqab’s hills, 27 November 2014. Photo 
by Doaa Hammoudeh.
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However, state surveillance through investigators is not the only reason behind 
community disintegration and mistrust. Residents emphasize that Kufr ‘Aqab is a 
“functional” space dictated by political necessity rather than living convenience and 
preference. Furthermore, it lacks traditional components of Palestinian society, which 
are characterized by knowledge of neighbors and surrounding communities. Instead, 
Sireen, 32, stated, “What unites us all is that we want to keep our residency, nothing 
more. The area collected people from all over the country with different lifestyles and 
morals, all for the same purpose.”
Moreover, this condition has repercussions on subjective emotional and psychological 
wellbeing. Noor, 23, described this impact:
I feel alone in all of this crowding because I don’t know anybody . . . I keep 
comparing my life now to my life before moving to Kufr ‘Aqab . . . There, I 
felt like I was part of a community. I know them and they know me. I used to 
belong to something and it made me happy; now I feel empty. They [Israelis] 
have taken away our sense of belonging and have distorted our traditions.
Conclusion
The Kufr ‘Aqab phenomenon is situated within a broader context of settler-colonialism, 
seeking to empty Jerusalem of its Palestinian inhabitants through gradual displacement 
toward the peripheries “outside” the separation wall. While many residents of Kufr ‘Aqab 
recognize their predicament as part of broader policies of displacement and exclusion, 
their immediate connection to it presents an inherent tension. That is, relocation to Kufr 
‘Aqab has helped Israel’s policies of displacement succeed. These policies have forced 
residents to constantly have to “prove their existence,” which they must substantiate 
with meticulous documentation attesting to a connection with Jerusalem as well as 
intrusive investigations that cause community disintegration and negatively impact 
sense of belonging, and therefore wellbeing.
The seeming perpetual limbo has compromised their quality of life, and family 
mobility is ultimately constrained by a series of bureaucratic and physical obstacles. 
As one resident putLW³\RXSXWRXWRQH¿UHRQO\IRUDQRWKHUWR be ignited, and it goes 
on and on.” Indeed, the overwhelming presence of the Israeli state is expressed and 
reinforced through physical barriers that obstruct movement into and out of Jerusalem 
(and its neighboring villages). For residents with families of different legal status, 
physical barriers have severe consequences on social and familial relations, permeating 
all aspects of life, including, literally, the body. 
Palestinian families living in Kufr ‘Aqab whose members hold different legal statuses 
¿QGWKHPVHOYHVOLYLQJRQDseeming continuum of mobility and immobility. While there 
are relative “freedoms” for those with Jerusalem residency, compared to Palestinians 
holding West Bank residency, the formation of the family comprising different legal 
statuses neutralizes these “freedoms.” This brings in a paradoxical sense of “immobile 
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mobility,” where the family must move to an ambiguous and precarious location in order 
to maintain residency for some (despite their ability to move freely, in theory, by virtue 
of legal status). This is exacerbated by the consequences of bureaucratic and indirect 
yet acute forms of violence. These constitute, as Shalhoub-Kevorkian argues, a form 
of structural violence as part of a logic of elimination.30 As the narratives highlight, the 
biopolitical practices of mobility regulation have become deeply entrenched in issues 
that are both intimately personal and mundane. These include an individual’s right to 
love, to marry, and to have and live with a family. They also encompass an individual’s 
ability to register their FKLOGUHQ WKURXJK RI¿FLDO V\VWHPV DQG PDLQWDLQ WUDGLWLRQDO
support systems from immediate and extended family. The biopolitical separation has 
been internalized to the extent that some women resort to manipulating their bodies 
with technologies to conform to Israel’s restrictions by inducing birth prematurely, for 
example. These policies have compromised the viability of the family as a stable body, 
threatening its survival and destabilizing any sense of family normalcy. 
7KHUDPL¿FDWLRQVof this particular setting are all-encompassing, affecting individual 
and family life, as well as communal life, and its structures and support systems. In 
effect, these policies and their attendant pressures increasingly impact the political 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQV RI .XIU µ$TDE¶V residents, which are internalized and articulated in 
language. For example, as one participant noted, Palestinians with Jerusalem IDs 
would say ihna (us) in reference to Jerusalem ID holders and intu (you) in reference to 
Palestinians with West Bank IDs, while Palestinians with West Bank IDs use the reverse, 
as if they are no longer part of the same Palestinian national polity. As the narratives 
KDYHVKRZQWKHVHKDYHEHFRPHUHL¿HG in a potential self-policing in love based on legal 
status, potentially impacting marriage patterns and marriageability. The narratives raise 
concerns about whether Israeli policies may in the future cause additional separation of 
the Jerusalemite community from the rest of the Palestinian community by changing 
marriage patterns in ways which correspond to accommodating a very harsh reality. 
These overarching policiesRIGLVSODFHPHQWDQGELRSROLWLFDOUHJXODWLRQFDPRXÀDJHG
by the formality and ULJLGQHVV RI WKH VWDWH EXUHDXFUDF\ LQ¿OWUDWH WKHPRVW LQWLPDWH
and seemingly mundane aspects of individual and family life. The repercussions of 
such everyday forms of violence make it clear that, in this context, little can be taken 
for granted. Indeed, the Kufr ‘Aqab predicament highlights the social suffering of a 
particularly vulnerable group, governed by ambiguity and uncertainty within a context 
of prolonged Israeli military occupation, subjugation, and political oppression. Family 
life decisions become dictated by politically induced calculations, which reinforce and 
create new forms of social suffering that comeWRGH¿QHIDPLO\PRELOLW\.XIUµ$TDEDV
a case studyH[HPSOL¿HVDSDUDGR[LFDOVWDWHRILPPRELOHPRELOLW\DQGIXUWKHUKLJKOLJKWV 
the mundane and yet totalizing nature of systemic political violence.
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